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This paper examines the crowding-out hypothesis of Taiwan, under which, the policy 
problem of Taiwan are evaluated. To account for the effect of underlying regime change such as 
financial openness, a Markov regime-switching framework is employed. Evidence from Taiwan 
indicates that government spending on investment, instead of that on goods and services, 
substitutes for private consumption since 1990, which renders unconvincing the policy plea for 





This paper investigates the relationship between change in private consumption and 
increase in government spending. The existence of substitutability, or crowding-out, usually 
renders unconvincing the plea for expansionary fiscal policy. Crowding-out effect is largely 
related to the means used to finance an increase in government spending. If taxes are used to 
finance an increase in government spending, then this multiplier  is called the  balanced- 
budget multiplier, reflecting the fact that the fiscal action has no impact on the size of the 
government’s budget deficit or surplus. In this case, consumers reduce consumption spending 
to be able to pay the higher taxes. The decrease in consumption demand partially offsets the 
increase in government spending reducing the size of the multiplier. The offset is only partial 
because not all the financing for extra taxes comes from reducing consumption. Some comes 
from reducing saving, which is not a component of aggregate demand. 
Moreover, the multiplier process usually assumes that government sells bond to 
finance an increase in its spending, in this case, extra crowding out comes about in two ways: 
Firstly, it raises the rate of interest. To sell bonds the government must make them attractive, 
so it must raise the interest rate. The higher the interest rate crowds out all components in 
aggregate demand. Secondly, when the bonds mature, interest and principal must be paid to 
the bondholders. According to the Ricardian equivalence, people would expect that future 
taxes would be higher because of this and react by increasing saving to build up a reserve so 
that those anticipated higher taxes can be paid without disrupting future consumption levels.   
Bailey (1971) first formally documents the idea that there may be a degree of 
 
* Assistant Professor,  Department of Economics, Shih Hsin University ,  No.1, Lane 17, Sect. 1, Mu-Cha Road, 
Taipei, 11602, Taiwan, R.O.C., tsungwu@cc.shu.edu.tw . I am grateful to Dr. James Hamilton who kindly shares 
his GAUSS code as a public program. Special thanks go to Dr. Shen Chung-Hua and participants in the 1999 
Annual Conference of Taiwan Economic Association held at the Chung Hwa Institution of Economic Research. 
All errors are mine. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
  2 
substitutability between government spending and private consumption; Barro (1981) 
incorporated it into a general model to examine the direct effect of government purchases of 
goods and services on consumption utility. Kormendi (1983) and Aschauer (1985) applied 
the permanent-income approach and find a significant degree of substitutability between 
private consumption and government spending for the United States. Ahmed (1986) 
estimated the effects of UK government consumption in an intertemporal substitution model 
and finds that government expenditures tend to crowd out the private consumption. Recently, 
Aiyagari et al. (1992) and Baxter and King (1993) explore the effect of government spending 
shocks on various economic aggregates in a one-sector neoclassical growth model with 
constant returns to scale and variable labor supply. They find that increases in government 
spending significantly led to a decline in private consumption. Amano and Wirjanto (1997) 
test this hypothesis by estimating the intra-temporal substitution elasticity about 0.9, assuming 
that a representative consumer maximizes his lifetime utility by consuming two goods. 
Some empirical studies have found different results. In terms of a neoclassical model 
with increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition, Devereux  et al. (1996) 
examined the impact of government spending shocks and found that an increase in 
government consumption generates an endogenous rise in aggregate productivity. The 
increase in productivity raises the real wage sufficiently that there is a substitution away from 
leisure and into consumption. Thus, an increase in government expenditures leads to an 
increase in private consumption. Karras (1994) examines the change of private consumption 
in response to increases in government spending across a number of countries and finds that 
public and private consumption are better described as complementary rather as substitutes.   
However, it is not clear why either substitutability or complementarity would best 
describe the relationship between private consumption and government spending. It must be 
borne in mind that the above-mentioned conventional inferences are heavily dependent upon 
the untested underlying assumptions of time-invariance of time-series process with no 
changes in structure. Even so, regime changes and structural breaks are both economically 
and empirically relevant, and can severely affect the properties of inferential procedures. In 
light of this, we propose a Markov-switching model to examine this issue. The methodology 
of this paper differs itself from the previous researches in one important way: we explicitly 
take into account the regime-switching property of the parameter vector where the 
relationship between government spending and private consumption is determined by 
transition probabilities. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II develops a theoretical model. Section III 
analyzes basic time series properties. Section IV proposes a Markov-switching model and 
empirical results are presented. Section V discusses some explanations for the empirical 
results. Section VI concludes.   
Quarterly data derived from AREMOS/QNIA are used. AREMOS is a public database 
compiled by the Ministry of Education, Taiwan, R.O.C.. The sample period extends from 
1961:01 to 1998:03, and seasonality is adjusted by ratios to moving average multiplicatively. 
The private consumption includes consumer spending on goods and services. All per capita 
variables are obtained by dividing the aggregate measure by total population. 
In addition, we disaggregate total government expenditure into spending on goods and 
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II. The Model 
 
In this section, the theoretical model is developed using Hall’s (1978) Euler equation 
method. Hall’s model is based on the first-order conditions of a representative consumer’s 
intertemporal optimization. The appealing feature of Hall’s approach is that the resulting 
Euler equations do not require the specification of all future variables relevant to household 
decisions. Assuming an effective consumption function (Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992)) 
specified below 
 
i i G C C a + =




t C  is the real per capita effective consumption,  t C   is the real per capita private 
consumption,  t G  is the real per capita government spending, and a is the parameter 
measuring the relationship between them. 
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where  0 E  is the expectations operator based on information of period 0.  b  is a discount 
factor. Equation (3) is the budget constraint, where  t A  is the real financial assets net real 
government debt at the beginning of period  t , and  r  is a time invariant real rate of interest. 
Finally, assuming that  U  is increasing and concave in its arguments, and that 
ﬁ￿ ¶ ¶
* / ) 0 ( C U . As in Barro (1989) and Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), a function of 
G  can be added to the utility function so that the government consumption’s marginal 
utility becomes positive. Hence, the Lagrangean function for the optimization problem is 
given by 
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where  t l  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint equation above, 
which measures the marginal utility of wealth. The first order necessary conditions for period 
t  include the following equations. 
 
t t t C U l = ¶ ¶
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for  t =1,2,….., where 
* * * / ) ( / t t t t t c c U c U ¶ ¶ = ¶ ¶ . Substituting Equation (5) for  t l  and  1 + t l  
into Equation (6), the Euler equation between periods  t  and  1 + t  can be derived below: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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To investigate the empirical implications of the model, we assume that the change in 
marginal utility is negligibly small over time, so that  Equation (7) can be written as 
, )] 1 ( [
* *
1 0 t t C r C E
s b + = +  where s =  U’(C
*)/{C
*￿U”(C
*)} is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution. The relationship below is derived: 
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In terms of Equation (1), Equation (8) can be rewritten as 
 
t t t t t v G C G C + + = + - - ) ( 1 1 a g a                                            (9) 
 
Table 1   Nonlinear Estimation of Equation (8):  t t t t t v G C G C + + = + - - ) ( 1 1 a g a  
  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
a  -0.137  0.0874  -1.568  0.12 
g  0.999  0.0022  447.32  0.00 
Akaike info criterion  -5.942 
Schwarz criterion  -5.895 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.367 
Null Hypothesis: 1 = g   F-statistic=0.019 (0.89) 
 
To further the analysis of Equation (9), we have to estimate  g. Table 1 summarizes 
the nonlinear least square estimation outcomes, and  1 = g ; hence Equation (9) is reduced to 
the equation below 
 
, t t t v G C + D - = D a       t v ~ i.i.d                                        ( 10) 
 
Let lower cases represent the first-order difference of the logarithm of each series, then 
the econometric form of Equation (10) is written as a linear combination of parameters  0 a  
and  1 a  below.   
 
t t t g c z a a + + = 1 0       t z ~ i.i.d.                                       (11) 
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Although some categories of government spending, for example, free school lunch, are 
close substitutes for private spending, others (like spending on transportation) are probably 
complementary. And for many substitutability and complementarity coexist. Spending by the 
Food and Drug Administration may decrease private spending on drug and food inspection, HO: ANALYZING THE CROWDING-OUT PROBLEMS OF TAIWAN 
  5 
but it also increases private spending of them because of risk reduction. That is, careful 
interpretation is required to argue that the expansionary fiscal policy is ineffective from 
aggregate data analysis. Because government spending can be broken into several budget 
categories, it is unfair to say that spending in education and other welfare expenditure will be 
less effective in stimulating the economy, because their budgetary purposes are not to be 
economic stimuli. 
In light of this, Equation (11) is estimated by three empirical forms with respect to two 
categories of government spending. 
 
Model 1: Real per capita private consumption on real per capita total government spending, 
denoted by g. 
Model 2: Real per  capita private consumption on government spending on goods and 
services, denoted by gc. 
Model 3: Real per capita private consumption on real per capita government investment, 
denoted by gk. 
 
III. Analyzing Time Series Properties 
 
Since the empirical equation is Equation (11), we test for stationarity of each variable 
by different null hypotheses. Table 2 presents the ADF (Dickey and Fuller (1981), Said and 
Dickey (1984)) and the Z-test (Phillips and Ouliaris (1990)) for the null hypothesis of unit 
root. The  Z-test has the same asymptotic power as the standard ADF that allows for 
conditional heteroskedasticity in the errors and modifies the augmented Dickey-Fuller test by 
using the autocovariances of the errors to compute the spectrum at frequency zero. To 
compare the results with different null hypothesis, we employ the G-statistic proposed by 
Park and Choi (1988) and the KPSS (Kwiatkowski et al. (1992)) to test the null hypothesis of 
no-unit-root. Table 3 summarizes the results. That all series are stationary is unambiguously 
accepted. 
 
Table 2   Tests for Stationarity 
KPSS   
ADF  Za  Zt  G 
Level  Trend 
c  -6.15  -33.42  -7.65  1.26  0.109  0.101 
g  -7.63  -31.12  -5.96  1.56  0.101  0.099 
Gc  -5.21  -24.24  -9.88  1.69  0.123  0.011 
Gk  -8.11  -33.96  -7.82  0.98  0.091  0.019 
Note : The critical values for ADF at 1%, 5%, 10% significance level are  -4.0437,  -3.4508, and  -3.1505 
(MacKinnon  (1991)); those for  Za and Zt tests  are  -27.61,  -20.84,  -17.62, and  -4.005,  -3.461,  -3.155 
(Phillips and Ouliaris (1990)); for G -statistic, they are 6.63, 3.84, and 2.71. For the level model of KPSS tests, 
they are, 0.347, 0.463, and 0.739, and for the trend model, they are 0.119, 0.146, and 0.216. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Table 3   LS Estimation Results 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 






g D   0.0497 
(0.041, 1.21) 
gc D     0.0986 
(0.044, 2.197) 
 
gk D       -0.02 
(0.016, -1.276) 
ARCH(1)  0.995  0.629  1.33 
AIC  -5.612  -5.641  -5.613 
SBC  -5.564  -5.593  -5.565 
Adjusted R
2  0.013  0.041  0.0055 
Durbin-Watson  2.367  2.13  2.56 
F  1.477  2.29  1.63 
Note: Standard errors and t-statistics are in the parentheses. 
 
Table 3 reports the least square estimation results of the three models of Equation (11). 
Reading across Table 3, we have three important implications: 
First, although there is no ARCH effect, except Model 2, the goodness-of-fit statistics 
show that the data does not fit the models appropriately. For example, R
2 and F are too small 
to show good fit. 
Second, hardly can we find any evidence supporting the substitutability relationship. 
Although there is negative coefficient in Model 3, it is insignificant. Only in Model 2 do we 
find significant parameter estimate. Overall, we find that there is substantial crowding-in 
effect. That is, government spending is complementary to the private consumption. 
 
Table 4   Granger Causality Tests 
Lags 
Null Hypothesis 
2  4  6  8 
G does not Granger cause C  14.09(0.00)  1.82(0.13)  1.64(0.15)  1.34(0.23) 
C does not Granger cause G  15.95(0.00)  4.38(0.002)  3.18(0.006)  2.19(0.03) 
Gc does not Granger cause C  27.30(0.00)  2.83(0.03)  2.13(0.06)  2.24(0.03) 
C does not Granger cause Gc  20.27(0.00)  3.01(0.02)  2.73(0.02)  1.42(0.2) 
Gk does not Granger cause C  8.79(0.00)  1.23(0.3)  1.19(0.32)  1.01(0.43) 
C does not Granger cause GI  11.26(0.00)  4.15(0.004)  3.24(0.006)  2.33(0.03) 
Note : Numbers in the parentheses are critical probabilities of the F-statistic for the null. G denotes total government 
spending;  Gc denotes government spending on consumption and service, and Gk denotes the government 
investment. HO: ANALYZING THE CROWDING-OUT PROBLEMS OF TAIWAN 
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According to Graham (1993), Equation (11) is sensitive to the sample period. In light 
of this, we test for instability using CUSUM statistic and Granger causality. First, Figures 1-3 
plot the CUSUM of squares of the three models. Obviously, the three models have strong 
resemblance to each other, and the structural changes are found around 1970 and 1980. 
Hence, we continue with presenting a simple dynamic mechanism that could give rise to a 
Markov-switching relationship. In the next section, we are concerned with the possibility of a 
more general type of model where the parameter vector is allowed to undergo occasional 
discrete shifts during the sample period. Second, Table 4 summarizes the Granger causality 
tests results. To show instability, we conduct this test by taking 2, 4, 6 and 8 lags. Not 
surprisingly, we find the Granger causality test result is sensitive to the number of lags. The 
most sensitive one is the null that “government investment does not Granger cause private 
consumption.” This null is significantly rejected when the number of lags is set to 2; when 
we set 4 lags, the null is accepted. Similar problem is found for the null that total government 
consumption does not Granger cause private consumption. Therefore, relationship between 
these variables is subject to change. To motivate the analysis , we continue the Markov- 
switching regression. 
 
IV. The Markov-switching Model 
 
1. The model 
 
To examine whether there is evidence consistent with regime-switching between 
private consumption and government spending, the general Markov regime-switching 
specification of the three models is shown below: 
 
t t t t t t t t t S S g S S S S c e s s a a a a )] 1 ( [ )] 1 ( [ )] 1 ( [ 2 1 2 , 1 1 , 1 2 , 0 1 , 0 - + + - + + - + =             (12) 
 
where  t e  ~  i.i.d  N(0, 
2 s ) and with unobserved state  t S , which is presumed to follow a 
two-state Markov chain with transition probabilities  ij p . Equation (12) has the following 


























































The evolution of the unobservable state variable is assumed to follow a two-state Markov 
chain satisfying: 1 21 22 12 11 = + = + p p p p , where ) 1 | 1 Pr( 1 11 = = = - t t S S p ,  ) 1 | 2 Pr( 1 12 = = = - t t S S p , 
) 2 | 1 Pr( 1 21 = = = - t t S S p ,  ) 1 | 2 Pr( 1 22 = = = - t t S S p . The observation can also be thought of as 
drawing from a  mixture of two normal distributions. The state in each period determines 
which of the two normal densities is used to generate the model. Their correlation is assumed 
to switch between two regimes according to transition probabilities. For example, when the 
current relationship is in state 1, there is  11 p   chance for the next correlation to stay in the 
same regime; when the current correlation relationship is in state 2, there is  22 p   chance for HO: ANALYZING THE CROWDING-OUT PROBLEMS OF TAIWAN 
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the next correlation relationship to stay in the same regime. The estimation procedure 
consists of two parts: First, we begin with the unconditional probability of the state of the 
first observation (Hamilton (1994)). Second, the smoothed probabilities are calculated by 
using Kim(1994) recursive algorithm, which are also used for weighting data and conducting 
the regression. 
Moreover, we briefly introduce the score-based specification tests. Interested readers 
are directed to Norden and Vigfusson (1996, pp.26-27) and cited papers  for detailed 
explanations. To test whether there is two regimes underlying the model, the null hypothesis 
is 
 
H0: 2 , 0 1 , 0 a a = ,  2 , 1 1 , 1 a a = , and  2 1 s s =                                    (13) 
 
White (1987) presents a general score-based tests for Equation (13) in maximum 
likelihood models that leads to several immediately useful tests in the switching regression 
context considered above. Given a likelihood function  ) , | ( q t t x y L  mentioned previously, 
) (q t h  is simply the gradient of  ) , | ( q t t x y L   with respect to  q. White (1987) construct the 
general test by listing those  l   element of m · m matrix  ) ( ) ( ¢ · q q t t h h  that we wish to test 
in the  1 · l  vector  ) (q t c . He then let  q ˆ  denote our maximum-likelihood estimate of  q, 
and let  A ˆ be the 2 ·2 subblock of the inverse of the partitioned matrix below. Let  A 
denotes the matrix below 
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where  T  is the sample size. In this case, White shows that if the model is well specified, 
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will have a  ) (
2 l c  asymptotic distribution. The tests of parameters of two regimes follow 
conventional Wald test statistic formula. Interested readers are  referred to Norden and 
Schaller (1996). 
Hamilton (1990) discusses theses tests in the context of Markov mixture of normal 
distributions model and presents evidence that White’s tests tends to over reject the null 
hypothesis in small samples. Accordingly, a ll the tests statistics presented below are 
interpreted using 1% significance level as Hamilton suggested. 
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2. Empirical Results 
 
Table 5 presents the ML approximation results of three Markov-switching models. 
Model 1 reports the estimation results of private consumption on total government spending. 
It identifies two regimes of the same signs. Total government spending does not substitute 
for the private consumption; instead, it “crowds in” the private consumption. The transition 
probability indicates that if the state of current period is in the first regime, there is 97.1% 
chance to stay in the same state next period. And if the state of current period is in the second 
regime, there is 98.01% chance to stay in the same state next period. According to the 
transition probabilities, hardly can we judge which regime dominates over time. The limiting 
probability that the relationship will be in regime 1 at any given time is 0.029, and regime 1 
is expected to persist for 34.5 quarters, on average. The relationship will be in regime 2 at 
any given time is 0.0199, and regime 2 is expected to persist for 50 quarters, on average. 
Model 2 reports the estimation results of private consumption on government spending 
on goods and services. Two regimes with different signs are identified. However, the a 1 
parameter estimate of the second regime is insignificantly negative, we do not accept it. 
Hence, the substitutability hypothesis is also rejected by Model 2 in favor of the alternative 
that the government spending on goods and services “crowds in” private consumption. The 
transition probability indicates that if the state of current period is in the first regime, there is 
97.5% chance to stay in the same state next period. And if the state of current period is in the 
second regime, there is 96.7% chance to stay in the same state next period. Similarly, the 
transition probabilities do not inform us which regime dominates over time. The limiting 
probability that the relationship will be in regime 1 at any given time is 0.025, and regime 1 
is expected to persist for 40 quarters, on average. The relationship will be in regime 2 at any 
given time is 0.033, and regime 2 is expected to persist for 30.3 quarters, on average. 
 
Table 5   ML Estimates of Parameters for Two-Regime Markov-switching Regressions 
  a 0  a 1  pii  s  
Model 1: Total Government Spending   
H0: a 0,1 = a 0,2, a 1,1 = a 1,2, and s 1 = s 2       Wald Test Statistic = 38.43 (0.00) ~c
2(6) 
AIC= -8.236 
















Model 2: Government Consumption 
H0: a 0,1 = a 0,2, a 1,1 = a 1,2, and s 1 = s 2      Wald Test Statistic = 37.65 (0.000) ~c
2(6) 
AIC= -8.583 
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Table 5    (Continued) 
  a 0  a 1  pii  s  
Model 3: Government Investment 
H0: a 0,1 = a 0,2, a 1,1 = a 1,2, and s 1 = s 2       Wald Test Statistic = 67.08 (0.00) ~c
2(6) 
AIC= -8.236 
















Note: Standard errors and t-statistics are in the parentheses. 
 
Model 3 reports the estimation results of private consumption on government 
investment. Two regimes with different signs are identified. In sharp contrast to previous 
outcomes, the substitutability relationship is found.  1 a  of regime 1 is significantly positive 
and  1 a  of regime 2 is significantly negative at 1 % significance level. Hence. Regime 2 
substantially implies a substitutability relationship between private consumption and 
government investment, which supports the crowding-out hypothesis. The transition 
probability indicates that if the state of current period is in the first regime, there is 97.3% 
chance to stay in the same regime next period. And if the state of current period is in the 
second regime, there is 98.9% chance to stay in the same state next period. The limiting 
probability that the relationship will be in regime 1 at any given time is 0.027, and regime 1 
is ex pected to persist for 40 quarters, on average. The relationship will be in regime 2 at any 
given time is 0.011, and regime 2 is expected to persist for 90 quarters, on average. Therefore, 
it would be clear that regime 2 (the crowding-out regime) has stronger persistence, which 
exerts dominant effect on the relationship over time. 
The specification tests are summarized at each panel of Table 5. The critical values of 
) 6 (
2 c  at  10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are, respectively, 7.78, 9.49, and 13.3. 
Obviously, the null hypothesis of model misspecification is rejected at least 1% significance 
level, and support the alternative that the model is appropriately described by Markov- 
switching. 




To sum up, there is one important policy implication: The substitutability hypothesis 
holds only when the regressor is government investment. Government spending on goods 
and services does not crowd out, or substitute for, the private consumption. Government 
investment implies the coexistence of both effects: crowding-in and crowding-out. The 
dominant impact of crowding-out effect would make the government spending multiplier 
smaller than it is anticipated. Figure 4-6 present the  inferred probabilities of state 1. To 
simplify the discussion, we examine Figure 6 which plots the inferred posterior probabilities 
of regime 1 of Model 3.   
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Figure 6   Inferred Probabilities: Model 3 
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In Figure 6, there are two periods that crowding-out (substitutability) has dominant 
effect on the relationship. The first period is a range from 1990 to now, the second period is 
that before 1980. The dominant crowding-in effect took place between 1980 and 1990. There 
are two possible explanations for the first dating of crowding-out regime.
1 
The first explanation is related to the level of employment. The multiplier process 
causes an increase in government spending, or any other exogenous increase in spending, to 
have a greater ultimate effect on the nominal level of income through price increases, real 
income increases, or both, depending on where the economy is relative to full employment. 
Although we have no empirical evidences to show whether the 1990s is a high-employment 
era, it is known that Taiwan exhibits a strong consumption propensity and high saving rate in 
the 1990s (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6   Disposable Income, Final Consumption and Savings, NT$ 
Year  Disposable Income  Final Consumption  Savings Rate, % 
1964  28591  25381  11.23 
1970  44486  40929  8.00 
1975  101821  86849  14.87 
1980  233112  179687  23.17 
1985  320495  246277  23.52 
1990  520147  370323  28.80 
1994  769755  545987  29.07 
Source:  Report of the Survey of  Family Income & Expenditure in Taiwan Area of Republic of China, 1997. 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C.. 
 
The second explanation is related to the relative ineffectiveness of expansionary fiscal 
policy in a flexible exchange rate regime, as indicated by the standard Mundell-Fleming 
theory, which argues that, given imperfect capital mobility, the ability of expansionary fiscal 
policy to affect aggregate demand is related to the flexibility of exchange rate. Under flexible 
exchange rate regimes, expansionary fiscal policy can stimulate aggregate demand, but it 
also raises interest rate which is supposed to reduce domestic private investment. The 
intuition behind these theoretical results is straightforward and can be found easily (see 
Krugman and Obstfeld (1997, pp.499-503)). A stronger version of this perspective was first 
documented by Mundell and Fleming in the early 1960s, Barro (1990, ch.12-14) rigorously 
analyzes this issue, and McKibbin and Sachs (1991) develop a dynamic version of the 
Mundell-Fleming approach and concluded that, given floating exchange rate, commercial 
policy would be less effective in improving U.S. trade deficit. 
During the past decades, the foreign exchange market of Taiwan has experienced a 
structural transition from fixed to flexible regime. On October 10, 1978, Taiwan announced 
to terminate fixed exchange rate, and the foreign exchange market began to operate formally 
on February 1, 1979. The second financial liberalization began with the late 1980s, the 
domestic foreign exchange market has been further liberalized up to now. For instance, 
Figure 7 shows that the spot exchange rate has larger fluctuation since the mid-1980s. 
 
1. See Shirley (1983) and Gustav (1992) for relevant discussions. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 












Figure 7   Spot Exchange Rate 
 
 
Explanations to the second crowding-out dating of government investment have many 
possibilities. First, the government investment during this period was mainly focused on the 
expansion of national defense and the state-owned enterprises, which largely transferred 
private consumption to the army. Second, up to 1970s, the economy of Taiwan was 
confronted with three severe problems: budget deficit, inflationary pressure, and confidence 
problems. The budget deficit was due to the growing fiscal spending on economic 
reconstruction since the World War II. The inflation pressure was related to two oil crises and 
increasing fiscal spending. The confidence problem was rooted in the political struggle 
between Taiwan and communist China, especially the ending of diplomatic relationship with 
U.S. in 1978, which negatively affected the confidence of Taiwan residents. These problems 
could adversely affect the multiplier effect of expansionary government investment on 
private consumption. 
Between 1970 and 1990, government investment was mainly related to infrastructure 
construction, the typical example is the Ten Great Economic Constructions. Hence, it might 
be the reason why the crowding-in effect dominates. The rationale is simple: Aschauer 
(1989a, 1989b, 1990) shows that if infrastructure construction turns down, then total factor 
productivity turns down slightly later. The point is that the infrastructure construction will 
provide a service which minimizes cost; for example, the telecommunication system 
improves information technology and e nhances production efficiency and more highway 
saves time spent in traffic and so on. 
In this section, I attempt to explain the results from the experiences of Taiwan’s 
economic development. However, careful interpretations are required. Because at any point 
of time, the explanations are not mutually exclusive, but reflect the synthesis of different 
forces. 
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The crowding-out phenomenon describes the process whereby an increase in 
government spending decreases other components of aggregate demand, thus reducing the 
government spending multiplier effect on stimulating aggregate demand. During the 
multiplier process, several factors crowd out aggregate demand. Financing an increase in 
government spending by increasing taxes or by selling bonds to the public causes crowding 
out forces to reduce the magnitude of the multiplier. Although financing by printing money 
may avert crowding out effect temporarily, it will cause inflation and raise the interest rate in 
the future. However, whether the increase in national income is due to the increase in the 
money supply or the increase in government spending is still a debatable issue. This paper 
indicates that the existence of dominant crowding-out effect renders unconvincing the 
Keynesian plea for expansionary public investment of Taiwan since 1990s. 
There are two modifications which could be made to improve the conclusion in the 
future. Firstly, as discussed in previous section, to extend this issue to more government 
spending categories can be helpful to this research issue. Secondly, although Graham (1993) 
argues that real disposable income is an important factor in this modeling, however, partly 
because of the lack of quarterly data on Taiwan’s real disposable income, and partly because 
of not to complicating the convergence of maximum likelihood computation and making this 
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